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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND STOCK PRICE CRASHES POST-CROSS-
DELISTING 
 





We test whether cross-delisted firms from the major U.S. stock exchanges experience an 
increase in crash risk associated with earnings management. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that earnings management have a greater positive impact on stock 
price crash risk post-cross-delisting when compared to a sample of still cross-listed 
firms. Moreover, our results suggest that this effect is more pronounced for cross-
delisted firms from countries with weaker investor protection and poorer quality of their 
information environment. We further examine whether managers’ ability to manipulate 
earnings increases post-cross-delisting around seasoned equity offerings. Our evidence 
shows that cross-delisted firms that engage in earnings management to inflate reported 
earnings prior to a seasoned equity offering are more likely to observe a subsequent 
stock price crash. 
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Foreign firms that cross-list on a United States (U.S.) stock exchange commit 
themselves to a set of financial disclosure requirements, in general more stringent than 
the domestic reporting requirements, imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). This new legal environment brings important benefits to the firms as 
their corporate governance improves, as explained in the “bonding hypothesis” of Coffee 
(1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999). Moreover, Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) argue that this 
stricter regulatory environment mitigates managers’ ability to manipulate financial 
information. Those authors document that cross-listed firms on U.S. exchanges engage 
less in earnings management than cross-listed firms on other non-U.S. exchanges. 
Higher levels of earnings management mean that managers have more latitude to 
manipulate information and withhold bad news, resulting in a higher level of firm 
opacity as the financial statements become less informative (e.g., Jin and Myers (2006), 
Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009)). Therefore, firms where managers are more engaged 
in earnings management are more likely to observe, in the near future, a stock price 
crash, i.e., a sudden and sharp decline of their stock prices. Based on these arguments, 
we predict that after foreign firms cross-delist from the U.S. stock exchanges, as their 
legal environment becomes less strict (a reverse “bonding” effect), managers will have 
more incentives to use earnings management to withhold bad news. Therefore, we 
expect that post-cross-delisting firms will experience an increase in their crash risk 
associated with earnings management. 
We test our main hypotheses using a treatment group of 583 cross-delisted firms 
from the major U.S. stock exchanges (4,192 firm-years observations) from 38 countries, 
and a control group of 564 cross-listed firms (4,900 firm-year observations). We follow 
previous literature on stock price crash risk (e.g., Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009), 
Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a ; 2011b), Boehme, Fotak and May (2014), DeFond et al. 
(2015), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)) and use different regressions techniques 
and alternate crash risk measures. Our findings show a significant increase in crash risk 
associated with earnings management in the post-cross-delisting period relative to a 
control group of firms that remained cross-listed. Moreover, we find that this effect is 
more pronounced when foreign firms are from less developed countries (lower Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita) and countries with weaker shareholder protection 
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(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), whereas firms from countries with 
stronger investor protection are less likely to engage in earnings management post-cross-
delisting. This result is consistent with Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), who find that 
earnings management tends to be more pronounced in weaker investor protection 
regimes and poor information environments. Our results also support the idea that 
delisted firms with more opaque information environments (i.e., those with higher bid-
ask spreads or more research and development (R&D) expenses) are more prone to 
engage in earnings management. This effect is significantly higher in the post-delisting 
period relative to the pre-delisting period. Taken together, our evidence is consistent 
with the arguments of the “bonding” hypothesis in the sense that our results suggest a 
reverse “bonding” effect after the firm cross-delists and is no longer under the stricter 
legal environment imposed by the U.S. market regulators.  
We further extend our analysis to the issuance of new equity to relate our findings 
with other studies that document a greater incidence of earnings management around 
these corporate events. For instance, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) provide evidence 
that, prior to an equity issuance, managers have stronger motivation to manipulate the 
firm’s financial information; this evidence adds support to the hypothesis that seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) can also be proceeded by stock price crashes. Indeed, there is a 
growing literature on earnings management around SEOs associated with stock price 
crashes (Boehme, Fotak and May, 2014; Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada, 2015). We thus 
examine whether managers of cross-delisted firms engage in more earnings management 
around SEOs in the post-cross-delisting period. Although the equity issuance activity is 
significantly lower in the post-cross-delisting period, we still observe that post-cross-
delisting firms engage in more earnings management prior to the SEO than when they 
are cross-listed, which also reflects the greater incentives of managers to manipulate 
earnings around SEOs when the firms have no longer to comply with the stricter 
disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC.  
The empirical findings of our study contribute to the growing literature of stock 
crash risk that has received greater attention since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
(Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, 2011b; Boehme, 
Fotak and May, 2014; DeFond et al., 2015, Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada, 2015) and to 
the vast literature on the benefits of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange (e.g. Stulz 
(1999), Coffee (1999, 2002), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004), Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2009)) by showing signs of a reverse “bonding” effect after cross-delisting, 
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especially in firms with poor information environments, from less developed countries, 
or countries with weaker shareholder protection  
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
related literature and outlines our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and 
the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
There is, to some extent, an institutional guarantee that cross-listed firms in U.S. 
stock exchanges are held to similar standards as U.S. domestic firms, meaning that, on 
average, foreign firms benefit from an improvement in their information environment 
and financial transparency after cross-listing (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003). This 
rationale is based on the assumption post-cross-listing, due to the more stringent 
disclosure requirements, that managers have lower incentives to manipulate the financial 
reporting process. Consistent with this view, Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) show that 
managers of firms cross-listing in U.S. exchanges are less prone to engage in earnings 
management and that financial reporting is more strongly correlated with stock prices. 
Their findings are based on a matched sample of cross-listed firms on U.S. stock 
exchanges and cross-listed firms on non-U.S exchanges. Additionally, Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) point out that investor protection is the key driver of earnings 
management activity around the world. They examine cross-country differences in 
earnings management and find that stronger protection of minority investors’ rights 
mitigate insiders’ incentives to manage reported earnings because they have little to 
cover from investors. Further, they find a negative relation between corporate 
governance measures and earnings management proxies based on discretionary 
accruals1. Discretionary accruals are considered a measure of financial reporting opacity 
because it masks some information about the firm’s fundamentals (Sloan, 1996).  
Managers can use their accounting discretion to manipulate financial reporting and 
manage the flow of information to the market. For instance, managers can manipulate 
financial information disclosure by accelerating the reporting of future revenues or 
delaying the reporting of current costs to hide poor current performance. Conversely, 
                                                           
1
 Accruals can be decomposed in discretionary and nondiscretionary. The discretionary component of accruals identifies 
management decisions, while the nondiscretionary component reflects operating business conditions. According to prior research on 
earnings management (e.g., Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995)), discretionary 
accruals is considered a well-fitted proxy for earnings quality because it reflects management decisions.  
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managers can withhold information about strong current performance to create reserves 
in the future. These movements create a smoothing effect, making earnings less variable 
than the firm’s true economic performance (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). However, 
the amount of information that can be delayed or withheld by managers is limited and 
they tend more often to withhold bad news than good news (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 
2009). Consequently, as Jin and Myers (2006) refer, at some point in time all bad news 
will come out simultaneously, leading to a crash in the stock price. Indeed, some recent 
empirical literature on stock price crashes (e.g., Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009), 
Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a; 2011b), Boehme, Fotak and May (2014), DeFond et al. 
(2015), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)) provide evidence that firms that withhold 
significant amount of negative news for an extend period of time experience a sudden 
crash in stock price when the true information is revealed. Thereby, previous literature 
on crash risk considers earnings management based on discretionary accruals as a 
reliable predictor of crash risk. We combine these two branches of the literature to 
analyze how the relation between crash risk and earnings management changes after 
firms cross-delist from a U.S. stock exchange and that are no longer under the SEC 
disclosure requirements. If we believe that a reverse “bonding” effect will occur post-
cross-delisting, then we should expect a higher sensitivity of crash risk to earnings 
management. However, it is also important to emphasize that the quality of financial 
reporting is strongly affected by regulatory enforcement, legal environment and 
managerial incentives (e.g., Lang, Lins and Miller (2003), Lang, Raedy and Yetman 
(2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006)). Consistent 
with “bonding” hypothesis, Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003) find that cross-listed firms 
on U.S. exchanges have better information environment than non-cross-listed firms, 
which is associated with higher market valuations. Therefore, it is expected that strong 
regulatory enforcement and disclosure standards provided by a cross-listing in U.S. 
exchanges should reduce managers’ capacity to manipulate information. This argument 
stresses the importance of legal systems in protecting investors’ rights (e.g., La Porta et 
al. (1998), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)), which limits incentives to 
mask firm’s true performance (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003)). Furthermore, the 
level of opacity (i.e., information asymmetry) also affects the relation between earnings 
management and crash risk. Firms with more information asymmetry that engage in 
earnings management are even more likely to suffer crash risk (e.g., Hutton, Marcus and 
Tehranian (2009), Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a; 2011b)). Consistent with this view, 
5 
previous international evidence on crash risk (e.g., Jin and Myers (2006), Fauver, 
Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), supports that corporate managers in more opaque 
informational environments should find it easier to withhold bad news and, 
consequently, should experience higher crash risk. Thereby, we predict that cross-
delisted firms with poor quality of information environment that terminate reporting 
requirements with the SEC, should be motivated to engage in higher levels of earnings 
management.  
Based on that previous evidence, we formulate our first hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: After cross-delisted from U.S. exchange markets, firms that engage in 
earnings management will experience higher crash risk. 
Hypothesis 1b: The increase in crash risk associated with earnings management 
should be stronger for cross-delisted firms from countries with weaker institutional 
quality and firms with information asymmetry. 
 
Prior literature shows that managers manipulate financial reporting through 
discretionary accruals to inflate firms’ earnings prior to an SEO (e.g., Boehme, Fotak 
and May (2014), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)). Managers will be more 
motivated to issue equity when they have information about a decline in future earnings 
(Ross, 1977), or when they have the perception that the stock price is overvalued 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Previous research also finds 
support that equity issuance is associated with poor operating performance subsequent to 
an SEO (e.g., Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), Cohen and Zarowin (2010)).  
Recently, Boehme, Fotak and May (2014) find evidence that prior equity issues 
predict current stock price crashes. They use a sample of U.S.-domiciled firms and 
provide some interesting results: (i) SEOs involving the sale of secondary shares2 are 
even more likely to crash relative to those that do not involve secondary sales; (ii) crash 
risk is not mitigated by the degree of monitoring from equity analysts and reputable 
underwriters. Using a cross-country sample of European countries, Fauver, Loureiro and 
Taboada (2015) find that equity issuers experience a significant increase in crash risk in 
the post-SEO period; this effect is more pronounced for firms in poor information 
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 Secondary shares are shares that exist prior to an offering and are sold by either insiders (officers or directors) or large 
blockholders. 
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environments that engage in earnings management prior to an SEO. Based on those 
previous findings, we formulate our final hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-delisted firms from U.S. exchange markets will experience 
higher crash risk subsequent to an SEO, especially those with more aggressive earnings 
management prior to the SEO. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data  
 
Our initial sample, collected from the SEC’s website, includes all foreign firms with 
equity shares registered and reporting with the SEC. Information about delistings is from 
EDGARS’s3 archive, Form 15F filed between 2000 and 20124. Based on this 
information, we identified firms that cross-delisted and those that remained listed during 
our sample period. We cross-checked and complemented information collected from 
SEC’s website with information from other sources, including: i) Bank of New York and 
Citibank, which manage most of the American Depositary Receipts5 (ADRs) issued by 
foreign firms; b) U.S. markets as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, Over-
The-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and Over-The-Counter (OTC) Markets Portal.  
Financial data are from the Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database and stock 
price data are from Datastream. As a standardized procedure in literature, we exclude 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC codes between 
4900 and 4949) because their accounting figures are ruled by special statutory 
requirements. We also eliminate observations with total assets under $10 million to 
make firms more comparable across countries (e.g., Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), with 
negative or missing information on assets, sales, market and book value of equity. To 
reduce the effect of outliers, all the variables are winsorized at 1% in each tail. We 
measure all monetary variables in millions of 2000 U.S. dollars. 
Data on SEOs are from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC); we 
collected information on the issuance date, the proceeds raised in each issue, the 
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 Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system  (EDGAR’s) provided by the SEC. 
4
 Our sample period starts in 2000 because information about foreign firms registered and reporting with the SEC is not available in 
1995 and in 1999 at the SEC’s website. 
5
 Foreign firms can obtain or issue equity financing by using Level 1, 2 or 3 ADRs. Our sample only includes Level-2 and Level-3 
ADRs. A level-2 ADR provides shares listed and traded on the U.S. exchange markets. The Level-3 ADR is used when a company 
has made a public offering in the U.S. Our sample only includes Level-2 and Level-3 ADRs. 
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market(s) where the security was issued, and the offer price. Then, we follow Corwin 
(2003) and exclude all securities that do not represent pure equity shares (e.g., unit 
offers, rights, mutual conversions, equity offerings by closed-end investment funds, real 
estate investment trusts, unit investment trusts). This screen process leads to a treatment 
group of 583 cross-delisted firms (4,192 firm-years observations) from 38 countries, and 
a control group of 564 cross-listed firms (4,900 firm-year observations). Our treatment 
group includes all firms that have delisted at some point between 2000 and 2012, while 
the control group includes all firms that remained cross-listed. Other variables, namely 
industry-level and country-level variables, are collected from a variety of sources. All 
variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
3.2 Stock Price Crashes and Firm-specific Returns  
 
To estimate crash risk measures, first we estimate firm-specific 7 returns. As DeFond 
et al. (2015), we use weekly returns to mitigate measurement problems associated with 
low frequent trading and issues related with inaccurate return distributions associated 
with daily returns. We estimate firm-specific weekly returns from the model below, 
using the local market index and a world market index. As in Hutton, Marcus and 
Tehranian (2009), we include lead and lag domestic (world) stock market returns to 
account for nonsynchronous trading. 
 
, =  + ,	
,	




 + ,, +
,
 ,
 + ,                 (1) 
 
where Ri,t is firm i’s stock return in week t; Rm,t is the domestic market index return in 
week t; Rw,t is the return on the world market index in week t, and εi,t is firm i’s weekly 
firm-specific return. Following prior literature (e.g., Boehme, Fotak and May (2014), 
Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), we construct our measure of firm-specific return 
as the natural logarithm of one plus the firm-specific return (εi,t). The firm-specific log-
return is denoted as RETURN. 
We use alternate measures of crash risk. As in Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009) 
and Boehme, Fotak and May (2014), our first crash risk measure is an indicator variable 
CRASH, which equals one if a firm experiences one or more stock price crashes during 
the current year t and zero otherwise. A stock price crash, in year t, occurs whenever the 
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firm-specific weekly return of firm i falls by 3.096 or more standard deviations below its 
mean in that same year. Because cross-delisting announcements can themselves lead to 
stock price crashes, we eliminate those that happened around the cross-delisting 
announcement.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of firms that experienced a stock price crash 
in each year between 2000 and 2012, as well as the incidence of stock price crashes per 
year by treatment (pre- and post-) and control group. In Panel B of Table 1, we observe 
an incidence of stock price crashes of 19.5% (23.8%) in our firm-year panel of the pre- 
(post-) treatment group. The proportion of cross-delisted firms that register stock crashes 
in the post-delisting period is 4.3 percentage points (pp) higher than in the pre-delisting 
period and this difference is statistically significant. Panel C of Table 1 shows that the 
incidence of stock price crashes is of 20.7% (17.3%) in our firm-year panel of the 
treatment (control) group. The difference between groups is statistically significant, 
which means that the treatment group registers a higher proportion (3.4pp) of stock 
crashes than the control group of cross-listed firms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
A flaw of the variable CRASH is that it does not capture the asymmetry in the return 
distribution; when the left tail of stock returns distribution is fatter and longer than the 
right tail, firms are more prone of experiencing extreme negative stock returns (DeFond 
et al., 2015). To overcome this issue, in the multivariate analysis we use two measures 
initially proposed by Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) and used in several other studies 
(e.g., Chen, Hong and Stein (2001), Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a; 2011b), Boehme, Fotak 
and May (2014), DeFond et al. (2015)), namely the negative skewness – NSKEWN – and 
down-to-up volatility – DUVOL. The NSKEWN is defined as the negative one multiplied 
by the skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns in a given year. This measure 
captures the magnitude of left-ward skewness of the firm’s weekly returns; it will be 
greater when firm’s returns are more negatively skewed. Hence, larger values of 
NSKEWN indicate greater crash risk. The other alternate measure of crash risk is the 
down-to-up volatility (DUVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the firm-specific 
weekly returns that are below the firm’s mean divided by the standard deviation of the 
firm-specific weekly returns that are above the firm’s mean in a given year. DUVOL 
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normal distribution. 
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captures asymmetric volatilities between negative and positive returns. Once again, 
larger values of DUVOL indicate greater crash risk. 
Hypothesis 1a posits that cross-delisted firms that engage in earnings management 
will experience subsequent increases in crash risk. Consistent with previous literature 
(e.g., Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009)), we use the total value of discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management. High values of discretionary accruals 
suggest that managers manipulate the financial information to distort reported earnings, 
thus masking the true firm’s performance. To test hypothesis 1a we follow the literature 
(see, e.g., Chen Hong and Stein (2001), Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a), (2011b), Boehme, 
Fotak and May (2014)) and model the propensity of cash risk as function of earnings 
management. We use information from year t-1 to predict crashes in year t and estimate 
several specifications of equation (2).  
 
ℎ	, =  + 
,	
 + , +  +  ,	
 × , ×
 + ",	
 × , + #,	
 ×  + $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, ×  +
%
&'('	)* − ,,	
- + . + /0 + % + ,																																															      (2) 
 
where ℎ	, is the dependent variable that corresponds to the alternate measures 
of crash risk (NSKEWN and DUVOL) for firm i, in year t. ,	
 is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firms above median of discretionary accruals in their 
country, and zero otherwise. , is an indicator variable that equals one starting in 
year t+1 after the cross-delisting event, and zero otherwise.	 is an indicator 
variable that equals one if firm i is included in our treatment group in year t, and zero 
otherwise. The treatment group includes all firms in our sample that have cross-delisted 
at some point in time between 2000 and 2012. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Chen Hong and Stein (2001), Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a; 2011b), Boehme, Fotak and 
May (2014)), our set of controls includes the following variables: 12,	
 is the 
annual change in the average monthly share turnover in the previous year (t-1); 
345,	
 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-1; 36,	
 is 
the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1; 12,	
 is the 
average weekly firm-specific return in year t-1; 78,	
 is the net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1;	968:,	
 is the short-term 
plus long-term (total) debt scaled by total assets in year t-1; 89;<8,	
 is the natural 
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logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in the prior year, 
which captures whether the firm outperformed or underperformed the market; =,	
 is 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t-1; 
438189,	
 is the absolute value of discretionary accruals7, estimated according 
the modified Jones’ (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995). We estimate 













where 81893, = &∆8, − ∆83<,	- − &∆9, − ∆3,- − ;,	;	∆8, is 
the change in current assets, ∆83<, is the change in cash and equivalents of cash, 
∆9, is the change in current liabilities, ∆3, is the change in short-term debt 
included in current liabilities, and ;, is depreciation and amortization expenses, 
scaled by lagged total assets (8,	
); ∆6213, is computed as the change in 
sales minus receivables scaled by lagged total assets; ;;, is property, plant and 
equipment scaled by lagged total assets. 
Since the probability of a stock crash in year t is likely to be positively correlated 
with crashes in year t-1, we add NSKEWNt-1 and DUVOLt-1 to our set of control 
variables. In our main regressions we also include country, .D, industry, /E, and year, %, 
dummies to control for invariant characteristics across these dimensions. Because of this 
fixed effects framework, some of the coefficients in equation (2) drop out due to 
collinearity. We cluster standard errors at both country- and year-level.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables described above. We 
observe an average crash risk NSKEWNt (DUVOLt) of -0.1467 (1.0338).  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) 
 
Table 3 shows the number of equity issuances by country over our sample period. 
Each year we qualify firms as issuers if they have raised equity in the prior year. We 
show the number of issuers and non-issuers for three separated groups: (i) post-cross-
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 Equation (3) is run separately by industry. We assign firms to industries using the classification scheme of Fama and French (1997), 
based on 48 industry portfolios.  
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delisting group includes all firms that issued equity after being effectively cross-
delisted8; (ii) treatment group includes all firms in our sample that have cross-delisted at 
some point between year 2000 and year 2012; (iii) control group of firms that remained 
cross-listed firms over the sample period. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We observe in Table 3 that firms included in treatment group issue more equity in 
the pre- than in the post-cross-delisting period. The proportion of SEOs is 35% in the 
pre-delisting period, against 10% in the post-delisting period. This result is not 
surprising because one of the main motivations for the cross-listing decision mentioned 
in literature is related to capital raisings (e.g. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005), 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009)).  
 
In Panel A of Table 4 we show descriptive statistics for issuers and non-issuers in the 
treatment and control groups. Issuers have higher crash risk than non-issuers (treatment 
group displays a significant difference), are larger in size (SIZEt-1), engage in more 
earnings management (DISACCRt-1) and are less profitable (ROAt-1) than non-issuers. In 
panel B, we show that the unconditional probability of a stock price crash is 25.6% 
(20.1%) for treatment (control) firms that issued seasoned equity in the prior year. 
Conversely, the unconditional probability of a crash is only 20.1% (17.0%) among 
treatment (control) firms that did not issue seasoned equity in the prior year. The 
difference between issuers and non-issuers is significant in both groups. Results 
provided in Panel B of Table 4 corroborate the previous findings of Boehme, Fotak and 
May (2014). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Per hypothesis 2, cross-delisted firms should experience higher crash risk subsequent 
to an SEO, in the post-cross-delisting period, and this crash risk should increase if 
managers manipulate financial reporting prior to the SEO. To test this prediction we 
model crash risk as a function of earnings management and equity issuance and estimate 
different specifications of equation (4). 
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 Moreover, we compare equity issuance date with cross-delisting date to ensure that firms were already delisted. 
12 
ℎ	, =  + 
37,	
 + ,	 + , +  37,	
 ×
,	 × , + "37,	
 × , + #37,	
 × ,	 +
$, × ,	 + %
&'('	)* − ,,	
- + .D + /E + % +
,																																																																	                    (4) 
 
where ℎ	, is the dependent variable that corresponds to the alternate measures 
of crash risk (NSKEWN and DUVOL) for firm i, in year t. NSKEWN is the negative one 
multiplied by the skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns in a given year. DUVOL - 
“down-to-up” volatility – is the standard deviation of below the mean weekly firm-
specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-
specific returns in a given year. 37,	
 is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
raised equity in its home country in year t-1, and zero otherwise. ,	 is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firms above the median of accruals in their country in the 
year before equity issue and zero otherwise. , is an indicator variable that equals 
one starting in t+2 after to the cross-delisting event, and zero otherwise; starting in 
t+2	ensures that earnings are reported after the delisting event and in the year prior to the 
SEO. %(∙) is a vector of the following control variables as described before, which 
includes: 12,	
 is the annual change in the average monthly share turnover in the 
previous year; 345,	
 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-
1; 36,	
 is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1; 
12,	
 is the average weekly firm-specific return in year t-1; 78,	
 is the net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1;	968:,	
 is 
the short-term plus long-term (total) debt scaled by total assets in year t-1; 89;<8,	
 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) from equation (1) in the prior 
year; =,	
 is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t-
1; 438189,	
 is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated 
according the modified Jones’ (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995), 
defined as before in equation (3). We also include crash risk variables NSKEWNt-1 and 
DUVOLt-1. We cluster standard errors at year- and country-level, allowing for the error 
term to be correlated for firms within a country. 
 
In Table 5 we report Pearson correlation coefficients for our main variables. We 
observe that all measures of crash risk (NSKEWN, DUVOL and CRASH) are positively 
13 
correlated with SEOs in the prior year. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Defond et al. 
(2015), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), NSKEWN and DUVOL are also 
correlated with size, firm-specific returns, profitability, market to book ratio, alpha and 
with one-year lagged crash risk measures.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Earnings Management and Crash Risk  
 
To test empirically hypothesis 1a, we estimate various specifications of equation (2). 
Our purpose is to examine if cross-delisted firms that engage in earnings management 
post-cross-delisting experience an increase in crash risk. Therefore, our main coefficient 
of interest is  (,	
 × , × 	), which captures the change in crash risk 
associated with earnings management in the post-cross-delisting period for the treatment 
group relative to the control group of cross-listed firms. We expected this coefficient to 
be positive and statistically significant. Table 6 reports the results. 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
In models (1) through (3) of Panel A, Table 6, we present results using NSKEWN, 
while in models (4) through (6) we show results for the alternate measure DUVOL. We 
find a positive and statistically significant coefficient   in our regressions using 
NSKEWN, but not using DUVOL. As an example, results in model (1) show that cross-
delisted firms with discretionary accruals above-median in their country experience an 
increase in crash risk, post-cross-delisting, of 0.0749 that corresponds to 8.5% of the 
standard deviation (0.872), while experience a significant change in crash risk of -
0.02810 in the pre-cross-delisting period. We run different specifications of equation (2) 
to check the robustness of the baseline model. In models (2) and (4) we use firm fixed 
effects. The economic magnitude of the coefficient   in model (2) is larger than the 
baseline but in estimation (4) it remains insignificant. To mitigate the possibility that our 
baseline results are driven by differences in firm characteristics between treated and 
control group, we re-estimate equation (2) using a matched sample of treatment and 
control firms. We adopt the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology proposed 
                                                           
9
 The sum of coefficients 
,+ ,	
 × , × +#,	
 × =-0.0050+0.1020+-0.0233=0.0737 and the 
p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.0991.  
10
 The sum of coefficients 
,+#, × ,=-0.0050+-0.0233=-0.0283 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
(p-value of the F-test 0.0475). 
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by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to match each treatment firm with a control firm with 
identical pre-treatment characteristics (industry, country, year, and log of total assets). 
Propensity score was performed using the nearest neighbor algorithm with 
replacement11, which allows that a control (cross-listed) firm can be used more than once 
as a match. Thus, models (3) and (6) are estimated using matched samples; the results 
are similar in sign to the baseline results, although of different economic magnitude  
 
Taken altogether, we find partial evidence to support hypothesis 1a, i.e. that the 
sensitivity of stock prices crashes increases post-cross-delisting for the average cross-
delisted firm. Although the two main variables of crash risk – NSKEWN and DUVOL – 
are highly correlated (0.82), the results are only statistically significant for the first 
measure (NSKEWN). One possible reason is that differences in economic, institutional, 
and regulatory environments might undermine our results. We account for such 
differences in hypothesis 1b. Consistent with Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), weak 
investor protection and weak financial reporting standards give managers more latitude 
to manipulate earnings reporting. On the contrary, countries with stronger degrees of 
legal investor protection tend to be associated with lesser degrees of earnings 
management. Motivated by this literature, we test our hypothesis 1b that the increase in 
stock crash risk associated with earnings management post-cross-delisting should be 
stronger for foreign firms from less developed countries and countries with weaker 
shareholder protection. Thus, we re-estimate equation (2) separately for countries with 
high (low) investor protection and high (low) economic development. We follow 
literature (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997; 1998), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 
(2008), Djankov et al. (2008)) and assign firms according to the legal origin, i.e., from 
Common Law countries in the high group of shareholder protection and firms from Civil 
Law countries in the low group. Similarly, we assign firms into two groups– high and 
low – in terms of the economic development of their home countries, depending on 
whether GDP per capita is above (high group) or below (low group) the median value of 
all countries in the sample. This classification is consistent with the notion that the 
enforcement and quality of national institutions is correlated with economic 
development of the countries (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). Panel B 
of Table 6 shows the results.  
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 We apply matching technique with nearest neighbor and caliper, which corresponds to 0.2 of propensity score standard deviation 
(see Wang et al., 2013). The quality of matching is tested using the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) chi2 test; if the propensity score model is 
the most suitable one, the coefficients of such specification should not be statistically significant. 
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As we expected, both measures of crash risk (NSKEWN and DUVOL) are positively 
correlated with earnings management in the post-cross-delisting period for firms ranked 
in the low groups, being insignificant for firms ranked in the high groups. Regarding the 
legal system, we observe that for cross-delisted firms from countries with weaker 
shareholder protection - models (2) and (4) - coefficient   is positive and statistically 
significant using any of the alternate crash risk measures. Results are similar in sign and 
economic magnitude for the subsample of firms from less economically developed 
countries – models (6) and (8). Taking coefficients in model (2) as an example, the 
results show that cross-delisted firms with discretionary accruals above-median from 
countries with weaker investor protection have an increase in crash risk of 0.2712 (or 
30% of its standard deviation)13, post-cross-delisting, compared to the control group of 
cross-listed firms from countries with similar legal environment. This result is consistent 
with the view that cross-delisted firms from countries with stronger legal systems, 
stronger investor protection rules, and stricter disclosure standards are less likely to 
engage in earnings management, and consequently, are less prone to experience stock 
price crashes.  
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the idea that, after cross-delisting from a U.S. 
stock exchange, firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection suffer a 
deterioration in their corporate governance standards, which can be interpreted as a 
reserve “bonding” effect. In this study, we document an increase in crash risk associated 
with earnings management, which might be a consequence of that deterioration in the 
firms’ corporate governance.  
Additionally to country-level factors that may affect the overall quality of the firms’ 
information environment, we also analyze, under hypothesis 1b, firm-specific 
characteristics that may as well affect the quality of their information environment. 
Managers in more opaque firms may find it easier to withhold the disclosure of bad 
news, increasing the probability of a subsequent stock price crashes (e.g., Jin and Myers 
(2006), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)). Thereby, our hypothesis 1b predicts that 
the sensitivity of crash risk to earnings management in the post-cross-delisting period 
should be higher for more opaque firms. i.e., those with higher levels of information 
asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, we use two alternate proxies of information 
asymmetry. Our first proxy is the bid-ask spread, which is positively correlated with 
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 The sum of coefficients 
,	
+ ,	
 × , × +#,	
 × =-0.0835+0.2958+0.0563=0.269 and the 
p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.0991. 
13
 For this subsample, the standard deviation of NSKEWN is 0.9079. 
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information asymmetry (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)). We measure bid-ask 
spread as the annual median of the daily difference between ask and bid prices, scaled by 
the midpoint. Our second proxy is the change in R&D expenses. Aboody and Lev (2000) 
argue that R&D expenses contribute to information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsider investors due to the scarcity of public information on R&D activity and its 
impact on firm’s value. Using these two proxies, we create an indicator variable, 42G, 
that is equal to one for firms with information asymmetry above the median in their 
countries, and zero otherwise. This indicator of poor information environment is 
restricted to the interval (t-3; t+3), relative to cross-delisting year. Then, we create a 
triple interaction variable that captures earnings management and the information 
environment quality in the post-cross-delisting period,  ×  × 42G. We 
estimate equation (5) considering only the treatment group to mitigate mixed and 
confounding effects. 
 
ℎ	, =  , +
,	
 + , + 42G, +  ,	
 × , ×
42G, + ",	
 × , + #,	
 × 42G, + $, × 42G, +
%
&'('	)* − ,,	
- + .D + /E + % + ,																														           (5) 
 
where ℎ	, is the dependent variable that corresponds to the two alternate 
measures of crash risk explained above (NSKEWN and DUVOL) for firm i, in year t. 
NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the skewness of firm-specific weekly returns 
in a given year. DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the standard deviation of below 
the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above the 
mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. ,	
 is an indicator variable that 
equals one for firms above median of discretionary accruals in their country and zero 
otherwise. , is an indicator variable equal to one starting in t+1 relative to 
delisting event in year t, and 0 otherwise.	42G, is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one for firms above the median in their countries for each measure of information 
asymmetry (bid-ask spread and R&D), and 0 otherwise.	%(∙) is a vector of the following 
control variables as described before: 12,	
 is the change in the average monthly 
share turnover in the previous year; 345,	
 is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity in year t-1; 36,	
 is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific 
returns in year t-1; 12,	
 is the average weekly firm-specific return in year t-1; 
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78,	
 is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-
1;	968:,	
 total debt scaled by total assets in year t-1; 89;<8,	
 is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in the prior year; 
=,	
 is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t-1; 
438189,	
 is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated according 
the modified Jones’ (1991) Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995), defined as 
before in equation (3). We also include crash risk variables in year t-1, NSKEWN t-1 and 
DUVOLt-1. Table 7 displays the results. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
The results in Table 7 provide evidence that firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry are more prone to stock price crashes associated with earnings management 
post-cross-delisting. The coefficient   is statistically significant in all models. As an 
example, we observe in model (1) that cross-delisted firms with above-the-median 
discretionary accruals and poor information environment experience a significant 
increase in crash risk of 0.18314 that correspond to 19% of the standard deviation15, 
whereas in the pre-cross-delisting the change in cash risk is -0.13716. As predicted by 
hypothesis 1b, firms with higher levels of information asymmetry that engage in 
earnings management after cross-delisting tend to have significantly higher crash risk. 
Again, a possible explanation for such effect may be the fact that after cross-delisting 
firms no longer will be under the stringent disclosure requirements imposed by SEC and 
by others U.S. institutions. Overall, our results provide evidence supporting hypothesis 
1b. 
 
4.2 Seasoned Equity Offerings, Earnings Management and Crash Risk 
 
Our results so far suggest that after cross-delisting firms that engage in earnings 
management experience an increase in crash risk, in particular when their specific 
information environment is weaker (either because they are more opaque or the quality 
of their national institutions is poorer). In this section, we analyze a particular corporate 
event – the issuance of new equity – that has been shown to be highly related with the 
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 The sum of coefficients 
,	
+ ,	
 × , × 42G, + ",	
 × , + #,	
 × 42G,=-
0.0290+0.3527+-0.0327+-0.1664=0.1826 and the p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.0116. 
15
 For treatment group the standard deviation of NSKEWN is 0.9387. 
16
 The sum of coefficients 
,	
 + #,	
 × 42G,=0.0290+-0.1644=-0.1374 and is statistically significant (p-value of the F-
test 0.0222). 
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practice of earnings management (e.g. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010)) and with subsequent stock crashes (e.g. Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian 
(2009), Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)). Per our hypothesis 2, we expect that, 
after cross-delisting, firms that engage in earnings management around SEOs are more 
likely to experience a stock crash. We follow the literature (Hutton, Marcus and 
Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, 2011b; Boehme, Fotak and May, 2014) and 
first estimate a probabilistic model that estimates the probability of a stock crash as a 
function of issuing seasoned equity, having high levels of earnings management, cross-
delisting, and including the set of control variables defined in section 3.2. In this analysis 
we use only the treatment group to mitigate mixed and confounding effects. Our 
dependent variables are the following: 1) CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or 
more stock price crashes17 in a given year t and zero otherwise; 2) CRASH_ NSKEW 
equals one for firms above the median crash risk – measured by NSKEWN – in their 
country and zero otherwise; 3) CRASH_ DUVOL equals one for firms above the median 
crash risk – measured by DUVOL – in their country and zero otherwise. We include in 
all estimations year, industry and country fixed effects. From the results shown in Table 
8, after controlling for known predictors of stock prices crashes, we find robust evidence 
that stock crashes are more likely to occur after the issuance of seasoned equity.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We observe in Table 8 that the coefficient of SEOt-1 is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions. Moreover, when we use CRASH_ NSKEW or CRASH_ 
DUVOL as dependent variables the statistical significance of the coefficient of SEOt-1 is 
larger. A possible explanation is that CRASH does not capture the asymmetry in the 
distribution of stock return, therefore being less efficient to capture risk than the other 
two variables. In models (1) and (2) the coefficient of SEOt-1 is associated with an 
increase of 4.4% in the probability of a stock price crash in the subsequent year. This 
effect is larger when we use the other two alternate crash risk measures: 7.6% (8%) 
when using CRASH_ NSKEW (CRASH_ DUVOL), respectively. 
Previous evidence shows that an increase on crash risk should be stronger for firms 
that engage in earnings manipulation to inflate their earnings prior to the SEO (e.g., 
Fauver, Loureiro and Taboada (2015)). The rationale behind this hypothesis is that, 
following an SEO, if bad news about inflated earnings are revealed to the market, firms 
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 For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is identified if the firm-specific weekly return is 3.09 or more standard deviations below 
the mean of that year. 
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should experience a sudden drop in stock prices. Per hypothesis 2, we expect this effect 
to be stronger for cross-delisted firms, post-cross-delisting, as the quality of their 
information environment tends to deteriorate and managers have more incentives to 
engage in earnings management. To test this hypothesis we estimate different 
specifications of equation (4). To address concerns about unobservable country-specific 
characteristics that may affect crash risk, we match equity issuers with non-issuers by 
PSM. We implement PSM by first estimating a probit regression to model the 
probability of being an equity issuer using as covariates all variables included in the 
vector %(∙), as described in equation (4). Then, we match each issuer to a non-issuer in 
the same country, year and industry and with the closest propensity score.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Results in Table 9 show that our main coefficient of interest  (37,	
 ×
,	 × ,) is positive and significant in all models. This evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that post-cross-delisting managers are more prone to delay the 
release of bad news prior to an SEO, which increases the likelihood of a stock price 
crash. Taking the coefficients in model (1) as an example, equity issuers with above-
median discretionary accruals experience a significant increase of 0.15218 (or 16%19 of 
its standard deviation) in crash risk before cross-delisting, but the difference is even 
greater (0.267)20 in the post-cross-delisting period. 
Overall, results provide strong support for hypothesis 2; post-cross-delisting firms 
that engage in earnings management prior to the SEO have a higher probability of a 
stock price crash subsequent to the SEO. 
 
5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, we examine whether cross-delisted firms from the major U.S. stock 
exchanges experience an increase in crash risk associated with earnings management 
post-cross-delisting. We test our research hypotheses using a treatment sample of 583 
cross-delisted firms from U.S. stock exchange markets (from 38 countries) and a control 
group of 564 cross-listed firms. We employ different regressions techniques and 
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 The sum of coefficients 
37,	
 + #37,	
 × ,	=0.1266+0.0258=0.1524 and the p-value of the F-test for the 
significance of the sum is 0.0719. 
19
 For treatment group the standard deviation of NSKEWN is 0.9387. 
20The sum of coefficients 
37,	
 +  37,	
 × ,	 × ,	
 + "37,	
 × , + #37,	
 ×
,	=0.1266+0.4118+-0.2975+0.0258=0.2667 and the p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.0731. 
20 
alternate measures of crash risk. As expected, we uncover a significant increase in crash 
risk associated with earnings management for cross-delisted firms after the cross-
delisting event, which is more pronounced when firms are from countries with weaker 
shareholder protection (namely, Civil Law countries) and countries with lower GDP per 
capita. Thus, our evidence is consistent with the idea that cross-delisted firms from 
countries with weaker shareholder protection suffer a deterioration in their corporate 
governance levels after leaving the U.S. stock exchanges. 
Furthermore, we analyze how information asymmetry at firm-level impacts the 
sensitivity of crash risk to earnings management. As we predicted, more opaque firms 
with higher levels of information asymmetry experience an increase in crash risk 
associated with earnings management. 
We also test whether manager’s ability to manipulate earnings prior to an SEO 
increases in the post-cross-delisting. We find that cross-delisted firms that engage in 
earnings management prior to an SEO have a higher probability of a stock price crash 
subsequent to the SEO. 
Taken together, our results are consistent with the prediction that after a cross- 
delisting from a U.S. stock exchange, managers are more motivated to manipulate 
financial information, particularly in weaker legal regimes. We interpret this as a reverse 
“bonding” effect; cross-delisted firms suffer a deterioration in their corporate 
governance standards in the post-cross-delisting because they are no longer subject to 
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Appendix A - Definitions and Sources of the variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Firm-level   
ALPHA Logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from 
equation (1). 
Datastream 
Bid-Ask spread Yearly median of the daily difference between ask and bid 
prices, scaled by the mean of ask and bid prices. 
Datastream 
CRASH Indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences one 
or more stock price crashes during the current year t and zero 
otherwise. For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is 
identified if the firm-specific weekly return is 3.09 or more 
standard deviations below the mean of that same year. 
Datastream 
CRASH_ DUVOL Indicator variable that equals one for firms above their 
country’s median for variable DUVOL and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
CRASH_ NSKEW Indicator variable that equals one for firms above their 
country’s median for variable NSKEWN and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
Delist Dummy variable that equals one if a firm is delisted from 
U.S. exchange markets (NYSE or NASDAQ) in a given 




DISACCR The absolute value of total accruals estimated via modified 













where	ACCRUALSN,O = &∆CAN,O − ∆CASHN,O	- − &∆CLN,O −∆STDN,O- − DEPN,O	, ∆CAN,O is the change in current assets, ∆CASHN,O is the change in cash and equivalents of cash, ∆CLN,O is the change in current liabilities, ∆STDN,O is the 
change in short-term debt included in current liabilities, and DEPN,O is depreciation and amortization expenses, scaled by 
lagged total assets TAN,O	
; ∆REVENUESN,O is computed as 
the change in sales minus receivables scaled by lagged total 
assets; PPEN,O is property, plant and equipment scaled by 
lagged total assets. Discretionary accruals are then estimated 













DUVOL “Down-to-up” volatility defined as the standard deviation of 
below the mean weekly firms-specific returns in year t 
divided by the standard deviation of above the mean firm-





Indicator variable that equals one for firms above median of 





Indicator variable that equals one for firms with above 
country’s median for each measure of information 
asymmetry (bid-ask spread and R&D). This indicator of 
information environment is restricted to the interval (t-3; 





VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
LEVERAGE Total debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) divided by 
total assets. 
Worldscope 
Log Total Assets Logarithm of total assets. Worldscope 





NSKEWN Negative skewness defined as negative one multiplied by the 
skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns over a given 
year. 
Datastream 
R&D Changes in research and development (R&D) expenses. 
R&D is set to zero when it is missing. 
Worldscope 
RETURN Yearly average of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-
returns. 
Datastream 




SEO Indicator variable that equals one if a firm conducted a 
public seasoned equity offering in its home country in the 
prior year, and zero otherwise. 
SDC 
SIZE Logarithm of market value of equity. Worldscope 
STDEV  Yearly standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns.   Datastream 
Total Assets (TA)  Total Assets in U.S. dollars, converted at fiscal year-end 
exchange rates.  
Worldscope 
Treat Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is included in the 
treatment group, and zero otherwise. Treatment group 





TURN Annual change in the average monthly share turnover 
between t-1 and t-2. Monthly share turnover is defined as 
monthly trading volume (shares) divided by total number of 
shares outstanding during that month.  
Datastream 
Industry-Level   
INDUSTRY Classification scheme proposed by Fama and French (1997), 




SIC CODE 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. Datastream 
Country-Level   
GDP per Capita  Logarithm of GDP per capita. Worldbank 
Legal Origin Indicator variable that equals one for Common Law (Civil 









TABLE 1: Frequency of Stock Price Crashes 
Table 1 reports the frequency of stock price crashes for our sample divided by treatment and control group 
across 2000-2012 period. The treatment sample consists of 583 cross-delisted firms (4,192 firm-year 
observations) from 38 countries and the control group consists of 564 cross-listed firms (4,900 firm-year 
observations). For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is identified if the firm-specific weekly return is 
3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean of that year. Firm-specific return for firm i in year t is 
estimated using the market model from equation (1) and is computed as the logarithm of one plus firm-
specific return. Panel A describes by year and by treatment (pre- and post-cross-delisting) and control 
group the number (“No.”) of firms that experienced stock price crashes and the proportion of firms that 
experienced stock price crashes (expressed in %). Panel B shows the proportion of treatment firms that 
experienced stock price crashes pre- and post-cross-delisting over 2000-2012. Panel C shows the 
proportion of treatment and control firms that experienced stock price crashes over 2000-2012. 
Differences are expressed in percentage points (pp) and are tested using t- statistic test (in parentheses). 
***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
Panel A – Frequency of Stock Price Crashes 
  
No. Firms with Stock Price 
Crashes  % Firms with Stock Price Crash 




2000 53 0 23 13.5% 0.0% 13.5% 
2001 85 3 43 21.6% 17.6% 21.6% 
2002 90 9 59 25.0% 24.3% 25.0% 
2003 57 8 34 17.4% 16.7% 17.4% 
2004 63 13 47 19.7% 21.7% 19.7% 
2005 59 20 62 20.6% 26.0% 20.6% 
2006 45 16 57 18.1% 18.4% 18.1% 
2007 47 28 75 28.1% 19.2% 28.1% 
2008 45 48 102 37.5% 31.4% 37.5% 
2009 13 36 97 15.1% 24.2% 15.1% 
2010 14 28 56 23.7% 18.2% 23.7% 
2011 5 45 85 17.9% 30.2% 17.9% 
2012 0 39 110 0.0% 26.2% 0.0% 
Total 576 293 850  19.5% 23.8% 17.3% 
Panel B – Univariate Comparisons: Pre- and Post-Cross-Delisting 
  
Pre Post Difference   
No. Firm-years with Stock Price Crashes 576 293 
% Firms with Stock Price Crashes 19.5% 23.8% -4.3pp *** 
t-test (18.95) 
Panel C – Univariate Comparisons: Treatment and Control Group 
  
Treatment Control Difference   
No. Firm-years with Stock Price Crashes 869 850 
% Firms with Stock Price Crash 20.7% 17.3% 3.4pp *** 
t-test     (22.44)    
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample over 2000-2012. The treatment sample consists 
of 583 cross-delisted firms (4,192 firm-years observations) from 38 countries and the control group 
consists of 564 cross-listed firms (4,900 firm-year observations). We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) and firm-year observations with 
total assets under $10 million and with negative or missing information on total assets, sales, market and 
book value of equity. For each variable, we report the number of observations (“N”), the mean, the 25th 
percentile (“25th pctl”), the median, the 75th percentile (“75th pctl”), and the standard deviation (“Std. 
dev.”). NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in a given 
year. DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the standard deviation of below the mean weekly firm-specific 
returns divided by the standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. 
TURN is the yearly change in the average monthly share turnover in year t-1. SIZE is the logarithm of the 
market value of equity in year t-1. STDEV is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year 
t-1. RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. ROA is the 
net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1. LEVERAGE is the total debt 
scaled by total assets in year t-1. ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) 
estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity in year t-1. DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified 
Jones’ (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in year t-1. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
  
Full Sample 
  N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. Std. dev. 
NSKEWN 9,092 -0.1467 -0.5745 -0.1552 0.2645 0.8721 
DUVOL 9,092 1.0338 0.7938 0.9762 1.2035 0.3657 
TURN 8,124 -0.0024 -0.0126 -0.0002 0.0111 0.0576 
SIZE 9,092 13.6840 11.9576 13.6663 15.4462 2.3109 
STDEV 9,092 0.0627 0.0355 0.0524 0.0779 0.0388 
RETURN 9,092 -0.0033 -0.0076 -0.0020 0.0024 0.0106 
ROA 9,092 -0.0077 -0.0313 0.0333 0.0770 0.1748 
LEVERAGE 9,092 0.2287 0.0367 0.2075 0.3542 0.2009 
ALPHA 9,902 0.0006 -0.0323 0.0003 0.0055 0.0110 
MB 9,092 2.7950 1.0630 1.8384 3.2989 3.8576 
DISACCR 9,092 0.0000 -0.0348 0.0023 0.0361 0.0802 
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TABLE 3: Seasoned Equity Offerings by Country 
Table 3 describes the number of equity issuers and non-issuers by post-cross-delisting group, treatment group of cross-delisted 
firms and control group of cross-listed firms. Each year we qualify firms as issuers if they raise equity in the prior year (t-1). 
Each group reports the number of firms (“No. Firms”) and the number of firm-year observations (“Obs.”). Post-cross-delisting 
group includes all firms that cross-delisted at some point in time over 2000-2012 Treatment group includes all firms that are 
exposed to a treatment, i.e., cross-delisting. Control group includes all cross-listed firms in the sample. *Denotes a country 
designated as an emerging market by Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database. 
Group: Post Cross-Delisting   Treatment   Control 
  
Issuers Non-Issuers   Issuers Non-Issuers   Issuers Non-Issuers 
Country No. Firms Obs. No. Firms Obs.   No. Firms Obs. No. Firms Obs.   No. Firms Obs. No. Firms Obs. 
Argentina* 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 3 4 4 56 
Australia 5 6 5 22 13 27 16 94 6 9 7 48 
Austria 0 0 1 5 1 4 1 8 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 1 1 2 13 
Brazil* 0 0 2 14 3 4 13 105 12 20 17 182 
Canada 11 13 42 131 74 104 193 973 98 214 151 1,104 
Chile* 0 0 6 25 4 6 9 79 3 4 5 71 
China* 0 0 0 0 5 5 21 74 15 29 108 486 
Colombia* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Denmark 1 1 1 5 1 3 2 19 0 0 2 25 
Finland 0 0 3 15 4 5 5 41 1 3 1 12 
France 3 5 14 61 15 28 23 186 4 6 9 99 
Germany 5 6 16 63 12 28 20 146 4 9 5 50 
Greece 0 0 1 2 5 6 5 22 21 37 23 105 
Hong Kong 2 3 6 22 5 11 20 124 6 13 18 138 
Hungary 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 13 0 0 0 0 
India* 0 0 2 10 1 1 4 38 3 5 9 81 
Indonesia* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 29 
Ireland 1 1 2 12 5 8 7 47 5 12 7 77 
Israel 1 1 10 56 14 15 34 247 25 36 52 477 
Italy 1 1 3 17 2 7 6 57 3 5 5 62 
Japan 3 5 6 17 7 12 9 89 8 11 15 190 
Korea* 1 1 3 6 2 3 7 37 4 6 5 54 
Luxembourg 0 0 5 24 4 5 8 80 2 5 4 25 
Mexico* 0 0 11 61 1 1 16 173 8 14 17 187 
Netherlands 1 1 11 53 12 24 26 186 7 10 10 94 
New Zealand 1 2 3 19 1 2 3 33 1 2 1 13 
Norway 2 2 4 16 4 7 7 62 4 9 8 55 
Peru* 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 15 0 0 1 15 
Philippines* 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 1 15 
Poland* 1 1 1 9 1 2 1 11 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 12 
Russia* 0 0 3 9 0 0 4 49 1 1 2 20 
Singapore 1 1 2 10 2 4 4 38 0 0 2 24 
South Africa* 3 4 3 11 3 6 3 28 5 18 6 58 
Spain 1 1 0 0 4 8 4 22 2 2 2 16 
Sweden 3 6 8 48 6 11 12 113 0 0 1 15 
Switzerland 0 0 4 17 5 8 7 55 4 8 5 56 
Taiwan 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 11 5 11 10 84 
Turkey* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 7 
United 
Kingdom 9 16 26 102 38 70 65 414 15 24 28 304 
Venezuela* 0 0 3 20 0 0 4 43 0 0 0 0 
All Countries 56 77 210 891   257 429 567 3,763   280 538 548 4,362 
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TABLE 4: Seasoned Equity Offerings and Stock Price Crashes: Univariate Comparisons 
Table 4 reports univariate comparisons between equity issuers and non-issuers over 2000-2012. Each year we qualify firms as issuers if they raise equity in the prior year (t-1). 
Panel A provides the differences in means and medians between equity issuers and non-issuers divided by treatment and control group and reports the number of observations 
(“N”). NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in a given year. DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the standard deviation of 
below the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. TURN is the yearly change in the 
average monthly share turnover in year t-1. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-1. STDEV is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year 
t-1. RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
LEVERAGE is the total debt scaled by total assets in year t-1. ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. MB is the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t-1. DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones’ (1991) model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in year t-1. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Differences in means are tested using t- statistic test (not reported) and differences in 
medians are tested using Wilcoxon rank sum test (not reported). Panel B shows the proportion of firms that experienced stock price crashes by whether the firm has conducted an 
SEO in the prior year. For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is identified if the firm-specific weekly return is 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean of that year. 
Firm-specific return for firm i in year t is estimated from equation (1) and is computed as the logarithm of one plus firm-specific return. Differences are expressed in percentage 
points (pp) and are tested using t- statistic test (in parentheses). ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A – Differences in means and medians between Issuers and Non-Issuers 








   
  N Mean Median 
 








N Mean Median 
 








NSKEWN 429 -0.033 -0.090 
 
3,763 -0.190 -0.190 
 
0.000 0.001 538 -0.078 -0.135 
 
4,362 -0.122 -0.132 
 
0.222 0.603 
DUVOL 429 1.082 1.033 
 
3,763 1.027 0.955 
 
0.004 0.000 538 1.069 1.012 
 
4,362 1.046 0.989 
 
0.144 0.104 
TURN 417 -0.001 -0.001 
 
3,435 -0.002 0.000 
 
0.760 0.424 503 -0.005 -0.001 
 
3,779 -0.003 0.000 
 
0.404 0.824 
SIZE 429 13.790 13.607 
 
3,763 13.262 13.280 
 
0.000 0.000 538 14.256 14.118 
 
4,362 13.967 13.996 
 
0.018 0.056 
STDEV 429 0.071 0.060 
 
3,763 0.066 0.0532 
 
0.019 0.007 538 0.061 0.055 
 
4,362 0.056 0.048 
 
0.006 0.000 
RETURN 429 -0.006 -0.004 
 
3,763 -0.003 -0.002 
 
0.000 0.000 538 -0.004 -0.003 
 
4,362 -0.003 -0.002 
 
0.006 0.014 
ROA 429 -0.065 0.005 
 
3,763 -0.030 0.024 
 
0.000 0.000 538 0.008 0.032 
 
4,362 0.015 0.044 
 
0.028 0.003 
LEVERAGE 429 0.237 0.219 
 
3,763 0.251 0.246 
 
0.520 0.325 538 0.210 0.168 
 
4,362 0.211 0.181 
 
0.621 0.797 
ALPHA 429 -0.002 -0.001   3,763 0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000 
  
538 0.001 0.000   4,362 0.001 0.000   0.399 0.562 
MB 429 3.243 2.180 
 
3,763 2.549 1.624 
 
0.126 0.002 538 3.443 2.495 
 
4,362 2.884 1.943 
 
0.042 0.000 
DISACCR 429 -0.001 0.004 
 
3,763 -0.004 0.000 
 
0.489 0.271 538 0.006 0.007 
 





Panel B – Seasoned Equity Offerings and Frequency of Stock Price Crashes: Univariate Comparisons 
  Group:   Treatment Control 
  Issuers vs. Non-Issuers  Issuers vs. Non-Issuers  
 
Firms that conducted an 
SEO in the prior fiscal year 
Firms that did not 
conducted an SEO in the 
prior fiscal year 
Difference 
Firms that conducted an 
SEO in the prior fiscal 
year 
Firms that did not conducted 
an SEO in the prior fiscal 
year 
Difference 
No. Firm-years   429 3,763     538 4,362     
% Firms with 
Stock Price Crash   25.6% 20.1% 5.5pp *** 20.1% 17.0% 3.1pp *** 
    (11.86)    (8.94)  
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TABLE 5: Correlation Matrix
 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrix for all main variables for our full sample over 2000-2012. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC 
codes between 4900 and 4949) and firm-year observations with total assets under $10 million and with negative or missing information on total assets, sales, market and book 
value of equity. NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns in a given year. DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the standard 
deviation of below the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. CRASH is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm experiences one or more stock price crashes during a given year and zero otherwise. For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is identified if the 
firm-specific weekly return is 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean of that year. TURN is the yearly change in the average monthly share turnover in year t-1. SIZE is 
the logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-1. STDEV is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1. RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the 
residual estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1. LEVERAGE is the total debt scaled by total 
assets in year t-1. ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. MB is the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity in year t-1. DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones’ (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in 
year t-1. SEO is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm raised equity in its home country in year t-1, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix A.* 
indicates significance at least at the 10 percent level. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1.NSKEWNt 1 
              
2.DUVOLt 0.8208* 1 
             
3.CRASHt 0.5808* 0.5674* 1 
            
4.TURNt-1 0.0139 0.0107 0.0119 1 
           
5.SIZEt-1 0.1434* 0.0849* -0.0074 0.0517* 1 
          
6.STDEVt-1 -0.0950* -0.0497* 0.0393* 0.0815* -0.5535* 1 
         
7.RETURNt-1 0.0927* 0.0329* -0.0032 0.1140* 0.2621* -0.2872* 1 
        
8.ROAt-1 0.0935* 0.0410* 0.0069 0.0111 0.3995* -0.4109* 0.2923* 1 
       
9.LEVERAGEt-1 0.0046 -0.0151 0.0100 0.0182 0.1144* -0.0546* -0.0102 -0.0216 1 
      
10. ALPHAt-1 0.0638* 0.0492* 0.0173 0.1156* 0.0754* 0.1106* 0.6979* 0.1548* -0.0619* 1 
     
11. MBt-1 0.0312* 0.0461* 0.0155 0.0301* 0.2044* -0.0026 0.1054* 0.0477* -0.0735* 0.1537* 1 
    
12.DISACCRt-1 0.0073 0.0187 -0.0106 -0.0215 0.0071 -0.0319* -0.0005 0.1465* -0.0021 0.0019 -0.0090 1 
   
13.SEOt-1 0.0339* 0.0372* 0.0258* 0.0707* 0.0545* 0.0692* 0.0149 -0.0327* -0.0123 0.0356* 0.0500* -0.0197 1 
  
14.NSKEWNt-1 0.0449* 0.0271* 0.0217 0.0075 0.0749* -0.0296* -0.2865* 0.0145 0.0258* -0.2797* -0.0139 -0.0123 0.0101 1 
 
15.DUVOLt-1 -0.0042 0.0243* 0.0263* -0.0249 -0.0351* 0.0334* -0.6066* -0.0848* 0.0276* -0.5053* -0.0688* 0.0088 -0.0369* 0.8185* 1 
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TABLE 6: Earnings Management and Crash Risk 
Panel A of Table 6 reports regression estimates of equation (2) using different specifications. The 
dependent variable is one of the two alternate crash risk measures: i) NSKEWN is the negative one 
multiplied by the skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns in a given year; ii) DUVOL - “down-to-
up” volatility – is the standard deviation of below the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the 
standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. EM is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firms above median of discretionary accruals in their country, and zero 
otherwise. Delist is an indicator variable that equals one starting in year t+1 after the cross-delisting 
event in year t, and zero otherwise. Treat is a dummy variable equal to one for firms included in our 
treatment group, and zero otherwise. The set of control variables includes: TURN is the yearly change in 
the average monthly share turnover in the previous year (t-1); SIZE is the logarithm of the market value 
of equity in year t-1; STDEV is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1; 
RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual estimated from equation (1) in year t-1; ROA is the net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1; LEVERAGE is the total debt scaled 
by total assets in year t-1; ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated 
from equation (1) in year t-1; MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in 
year t-1; DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones’ 
(1991) Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in year t-1. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Country, industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions, except in models (2) and (4) 
whereas we only include firm and year fixed effects. In models (3) and (6) we use a matched sample; 
each firm from treatment group is matched by year, industry, country and with the closest log of total 
assets, to a firm from the control group of cross-listed firms. Robust t-statistics standard errors clustered 
at both country- and year-level are shown in parentheses. The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is 
also reported (in parentheses). The last two rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the 
coefficients [ +  ×  ×  +  × ]. Panel B of Table 6 reports regression estimates 
of equation (2) but performed separately for high (low) groups. We rank firms based on Legal Origin and 
GDP per capita. Legal Origin is an indicator of institutional quality (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008)); based on this indicator, we assign firms in high (low) group depending if they are from 
Common (Civil) Law countries. GDP per capita is an economic indicator collected from the World Bank 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects 
(FE). Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at both country- and year-level are shown in 
parentheses. It is also reported the p-value of a z-test that evaluates whether the coefficient  (,	
 ×, × ) of high group is equal to the coefficient of low group. ***, ** and * mean statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Earnings Management and Crash Risk 
  
Baseline Firm FE Matched  Baseline Firm FE Matched  
Dependent Variable: NSKEWN DUVOL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EM
 t-1 -0.0050 -0.0198 -0.0180 0.0051 0.0002 -0.0048 
 
(-0.21) (-0.72) (-0.33) (0.55) (0.01) (-0.24) 
Delist
 t -0.0878** -0.0652 -0.1128*** -0.0577*** -0.0512* -0.0657*** 
 
(-2.09) (-0.93) (-2.98) (-4.97) (-1.84) (-2.80) 
Treat











EMt-1 x Treat I x Delist t 0.1020*** 0.1300* 0.0515** 0.0176 0.0411 0.0067 
 
(2.70) (1.76) (2.52) (0.81) (1.36) (0.30) 
EMt-1 x Treat i -0.0233 -0.0161 -0.0059 -0.0022 -0.0149 0.0062 
 
(-0.71) (-0.32) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-0.74) (0.27) 
TURNt-1 -0.1202*** -0.1886 -0.0293 -0.0484 -0.0349 -0.0103 
 
(-3.96) (-0.93) (-0.28) (-1.02) (-0.43) (-0.20) 
SIZEt-1 0.0647*** 0.1958*** 0.0763*** 0.0240*** 0.1177*** 0.0279*** 
 
(7.00) (9.63) (7.84) (4.55) (13.56) (6.29) 
STDEVt-1 0.3206 -0.0471 0.4378 0.1861 -0.5019** 0.2100 
 
(0.43) (-0.07) (0.42) (0.69) (-2.00) (0.74) 
RETURNt-1 3.9595 1.3729 2.0936 -0.8292 -1.0788 -1.6287 
 
(1.29) (0.54) (0.57) (-0.47) (-0.97) (-0.88) 
ROAt-1 0.2357*** 0.1891* 0.2427*** 0.0338** 0.0199 0.0361* 
 
(3.20) (1.76) (3.06) (2.07) (0.46) (1.71) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.0013 0.2038 0.0859 0.0066 0.1088** 0.0507* 
 
(0.02) (1.57) (0.96) (0.20) (2.02) (1.77) 
ALPHAt-1 1.9641 0.5580 3.4332 2.8973*** 0.3918 4.0690*** 
 
(1.33) (0.24) (1.46) (3.03) (0.43) (3.24) 
MBt-1 -0.0041* -0.0082** -0.0040 0.0008 -0.0032** -0.0001 
 
(-1.67) (-2.27) (-1.22) (0.56) (-2.23) (-0.06) 
DISACCRt-1 -0.0014 0.0937 0.0192 0.0525 0.0673 0.0310 
 
(0.01) (0.65) (0.25) (0.79) (1.14) (0.80) 
NSKEWNt-1 0.0384* -0.1064*** 0.0244 
   
 
(1.79) (-6.72) (1.16) 
   
DUVOLt-1 
   
0.0358* -0.0984*** 0.0420** 
    
(1.68) (-5.33) (2.12) 
Constant -0.9980** -2.8326*** -1.1868*** 0.6474*** -0.4249*** 0.3684*** 
 
(-2.53) (-9.19) (-5.14) (4.23) (-3.21) (5.11) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No Yes No 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 7,027 7,027 4,300 7,027 7,027 4,300 
R-squared 0.065 0.058 0.077 0.062 0.09 0.081 
PROPENSITY SCORE       
LR chi2 (p value)   (0.493)   (0.493) 
[ +  ×  ×  +  × ] 0.0737* 0.0941* 0.0276* 0.0205 0.0264 0.0081 
p-value (0.099) (0.0915) (0.087) (0.300) (0.291) (0.371) 
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Panel B: Earnings Management and Crash Risk. The impact of institutional quality 
Quality proxy: Legal Origin GDP per Capita 
Dependent variable: NSKEWN DUVOL NSKEWN DUVOL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
EM
 t-1 0.0072 -0.0835 0.0142 -0.0456* -0.0145 0.0023 0.0006 0.0084 
 
(0.19) (-1.08) (1.13) (-1.65) (-0.37) (0.05) (0.05) (0.47) 
Delist
 t -0.0341 -0.1873 -0.0349 -0.0895** -0.0175 -0.2589** -0.0281 -0.1350*** 
 
(-0.42) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-2.11) (-0.29) (-2.52) (-1.05) (-6.36) 
Treat
 i 0.0415 0.0453 0.0458*** 0.0025 -0.0012 0.0707 0.0281 0.0386** 
 
(1.00) (0.40) (2.72) (0.08) (-0.05) (1.35) (1.26) (2.24) 
EMt-1 x Treati x Delist t 0.0543 0.2958* -0.0015 0.0855** 0.0294 0.2931* -0.0099 0.0948** 
 
(1.15) (1.67) (-0.08) (1.99) (1.65) (1.87) (-0.44) (2.19) 
EMt-1 x Treat i -0.0588** 0.0563 -0.0247* 0.0542 0.0113 -0.0522 0.0130 -0.0134 
 
(-2.52) (0.41) (-1.88) (1.43) (0.00) (-0.63) (0.72) (-0.50) 
TURNt-1 0.0182 -0.2069 0.0250 -0.0986 -0.1470 -0.1188 -0.1079* 0.0092 
 
(0.09) (-1.06) (0.25) (-0.79) (-0.70) (-0.46) (-1.88) (0.09) 
SIZEt-1 0.0698*** 0.0684*** 0.0269*** 0.0259*** 0.0658*** 0.0613*** 0.0241*** 0.0238*** 
 
(8.11) (3.84) (5.12) (3.15) (6.32) (7.34) (3.93) (6.50) 
STDEVt-1 -0.1152 1.7697 0.0603 0.7650 0.2777 0.2784 -0.0205 0.3579 
 
(-0.14) (1.04) (0.23) (1.37) (0.32) (0.26) (-0.06) (1.06) 
RETURNt-1 4.2627 4.0633 -1.6106 0.5032 0.2398 7.1007*** -3.7183 1.9856 
 
(1.07) (0.67) (-0.98) (0.15) (0.04) (7.07) (-1.25) (1.41) 
ROAt-1 0.1501*** 0.5678** 0.0313 0.0209 0.1651** 0.4432** 0.0115 0.0910 
 
(3.86) (2.22) (1.38) (0.29) (2.47) (2.61) (0.37) (1.62) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.0017 0.0743 -0.0003 0.0384 0.0614 -0.0246 0.0262 -0.0005 
 
(0.01) (0.43) (-0.01) (0.61) (0.61) (-0.35) (0.73) (-0.01) 
ALPHAt-1 1.8765 -0.0778 3.1500*** 1.7721 3.5806 1.1565 4.5986** 1.5217 
 
(0.62) (-0.12) (2.77) (1.17) (1.24) (1.13) (2.38) (1.65) 
MBt-1 -0.0027 -0.0220*** 0.0006 -0.0049* -0.0045 -0.0046 0.0003 0.0017 
 
(-0.72) (-2.78) (0.28) (-1.94) (-1.28) (-0.67) (0.17) (0.63) 
DISACCRt-1 0.0708 -0.3955 0.1131 -0.1394 -0.0523 0.0399 0.0498 0.0556 
 
(0.36) (-1.53) (1.49) (-1.44) (-0.42) (0.12) (1.10) (0.45) 

















Constant -1.9850*** -1.6102 0.2563*** 0.4823*** -1.4592*** -0.7538*** 0.2919*** 0.7509 
 
(-13.73) (0.00) (4.98) (3.36) (-5.74) (8.41) (3.58) (0.00) 
( <^ℎ = 9'_) (p-
value) (0.099) (0.073) (0.094) (0.032) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,954 1,817 3,954 1,817 3,991 3,058 3,991 3,058 
R-squared 0.075 0.082 0.077 0.094 0.059 0.102 0.067 0.086 
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TABLE 7: Earnings Management, Crash Risk and Information Environment 
Table 7 reports regression estimates of equation (5). The dependent variable is one of the two alternate 
crash risk measures: i) NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the skewness of the firm-specific 
weekly returns in a given year; ii) DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the standard deviation of below 
the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above the mean weekly firm-
specific returns in a given year. EM is an indicator variable that equals one for firms above median of 
discretionary accruals in their country, and zero otherwise. Delist is an indicator variable that equals one 
starting in year t+1 after the cross-delisting event in year t, and zero otherwise. INF is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one for firms above the median in their countries for each measure of information 
asymmetry - bid-ask spread and changes in R&D - and zero otherwise. We use two information 
asymmetry proxies: 1) the Bid-Ask spread is measured as the yearly median of the daily difference 
between ask and bid prices, scaled by the midpoint; 2) and annual changes in R&D. The set of control 
variables includes: TURN is the yearly change in the average monthly share turnover in the previous year 
(t-1); SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-1; STDEV is the standard deviation of 
weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1; RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual estimated from 
equation (1) in year t-1; ROA is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-
1; LEVERAGE is the total debt scaled by total assets in year t-1; ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. MB is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity in year t-1; DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
estimated using the modified Jones’ (1991) Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Country, industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust t-
statistics with standard errors clustered at both country- and year-level are shown in parentheses. The last 
two rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the coefficients [ +  ×  × 42G + ×  +  × 42G]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent 
level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Dependent variable: NSKEWN DUVOL 
Information Environment Proxy: bid-ask spread R&D bid-ask spread R&D 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EMt-1 0.0290 -0.0025 0.0171 0.0089 
 
(0.72) (-0.06) (0.87) (0.63) 
Delistt -0.0746 -0.1191** -0.0711*** -0.0772*** 
 
(-1.25) (-2.03) (-2.80) (-2.85) 
INFt 0.1369* 0.0642 0.0590** 0.0064 
 
(1.80) (1.50) (2.03) (0.34) 
EMt-1 x Delistt x INFt 0.3527*** 0.1387** 0.0874** 0.0707* 
 
(14.47) (2.16) (2.02) (1.69) 
EMt-1 x Delistt -0.0327* 0.0488 -0.0117 -0.0052 
 
(-1.86) (0.97) (-0.62) (-0.18) 
EMt-1 x INFt -0.1664* -0.0781** -0.0489 -0.0274 
 
(-1.86) (-2.23) (-1.31) (-1.09) 
Delistt x INFt -0.2242 -0.1105 -0.0569 -0.0435 
 
(-1.61) (-1.59) (-0.92) (-1.60) 
TURNt-1 -0.0086 -0.0249 0.0012 -0.0042 
 
(-0.04) (-0.13) (0.02) (-0.06) 
SIZEt-1 0.0725*** 0.0731*** 0.0235*** 0.0238*** 
 
(6.72) (7.21) (4.34) (4.64) 
STDEVt-1 0.3427 0.3382 0.2070 0.2089 
 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.58) (0.59) 
RETURNt-1 0.5534 0.3433 -1.1832 -1.1838 
 
(0.15) (0.09) (-0.58) (-0.59) 
ROAt-1 0.1788* 0.1803* 0.0088 0.0077 
 
(1.95) (1.88) (0.33) (0.28) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.0448 0.0510 0.0481 0.0515 
 
(0.44) (0.47) (1.49) (1.55) 
ALPHAt-1 5.0275** 5.1326** 4.3416*** 4.3048*** 
 
(2.27) (2.27) (3.45) (3.43) 
MBt-1 -0.0055 -0.0058 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(-1.16) (-1.22) (0.09) (0.02) 
DISACCRt-1 0.0099 0.0185 -0.0178 -0.0106 
 
(0.07) (0.13) (-0.37) (-0.21) 








   
(2.21) (2.22) 
Constant -1.8107*** -1.8521*** 0.5541*** 0.5510*** 
 
(-14.60) (-13.88) (4.14) (4.26) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,280 3,280 3,280 3,280 
R-squared 0.080 0.078 0.091 0.089 
[ +  ×  × 42G +  ×  +  × 42G] 0.1826** 0.1069** 0.0439 0.0470** 
p-value (0.012) (0.047) (0.137) (0.014) 
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TABLE 8: SEOs and Crash Risk. Probabilistic Analysis 
Table 8 provides the marginal effects from a probit model that estimate the impact of seasoned equity 
issuance in year t-1 on the probability that a firm experiences a stock price crash in year t. CRASH is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences one or more stock price crashes during a given 
year and zero otherwise. For a firm i in year t, a stock price crash is identified if the firm-specific weekly 
return is 3.09 or more standard deviations below the mean of that year. CRASH_ NSKEW  is an indicator 
variable that equals one for firms above their country’s median for variable NSKEWN and zero otherwise. 
CRASH_ DUVOL is an indicator variable that equals one for firms above their country’s median for 
variable DUVOL and zero otherwise. SEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm conducted a 
public seasoned equity offering during the prior year and zero otherwise.  EM is an indicator variable that 
equals one for firms above median of accruals in their country in the prior year to an SEO and zero 
otherwise. Delist is an indicator variable that equals one starting in year t+1 after the cross-delisting event 
in year t, and zero otherwise. TURN is the yearly change in the average monthly share turnover in the 
previous year (t-1). SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity in year t-1. STDEV is the standard 
deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in year t-1. RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual 
estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets in year t-1. LEVERAGE is the total debt scaled by total assets in year t-1. ALPHA is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) estimated from equation (1) in year t-1. MB is the market value 
of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t-1. DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, estimated using the modified Jones’ (1991) Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in year 
t-1. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Country, industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Robust z-statistic in parentheses. Pseudo R-squared measures how much of the variation of 
the dependent variable is explained by the regression. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 
percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Dependent variable: CRASH CRASH_ NSKEW CRASH_ DUVOL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SEOt-1 0.0441* 0.0438* 0.0757** 0.0759** 0.0805** 0.0806** 
 
(1.68) (1.65) (2.38) (2.38) (2.51) (2.51) 
EMt-2 0.0112 0.0113 -0.0129 -0.0128 0.0112 0.0114 
 
(0.73) (0.74) (-0.68) (-0.68) (0.59) (0.60) 
Delistt -0.0136 -0.0121 0.0002 0.0009 -0.0730** -0.0721** 
 
(-0.56) (-0.50) (0.01) (0.03) (-2.40) (-2.37) 
TURNt-1 0.0521 0.0379 -0.0785 -0.0801 0.0715 0.0636 
 
(0.43) (0.31) (-0.49) (-0.53) (0.48) (0.42) 
SIZEt-1 0.0099* 0.0092* 0.0366*** 0.0366*** 0.0279*** 0.0277*** 
 
(1.80) (1.68) (5.25) (5.29) (4.06) (4.04) 
STDEVt-1 0.9128*** 0.9400*** 0.2239 0.2417 0.4762 0.4933 
 
(3.03) (3.09) (0.58) (0.63) (1.24) (1.28) 
RETURNt-1 -0.9606 -0.1498 1.0221 1.5343 -0.2600 0.2953 
 
(-0.79) (-0.11) (0.65) (0.91) (-0.17) (0.18) 
ROAt-1 0.1238** 0.1206** 0.1016* 0.1010* 0.0896 0.0882 
 
(2.56) (2.49) (1.68) (1.66) (1.48) (1.46) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.0683 0.0684 -0.0198 -0.0204 0.0263 0.0259 
 
(1.53) (1.53) (-0.36) (-0.37) (0.48) (0.47) 
ALPHAt-1 0.6469 0.8168 2.036 2.1083 2.9566** 3.0361** 
 
(0.58) (0.72) (1.45) (1.47) (2.06) (2.11) 
MBt-1 0.0020 0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0027 0.0027 
 
(1.04) (1.00) (-1.25) (-1.26) (1.10) (1.09) 
DISACCRt-1 -0.1242 -0.1268 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0957 0.0943 
 



























Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 3,264 3,264 3,280 3,280 3,277 3,277 
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.058 0.051 0.051 0.043 0.043 
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TABLE 9: SEOs, Earnings Management and Crash Risk 
Table 9 reports regression estimates of equation (4) using different specifications. The dependent variable 
is one of the two alternate crash risk measures: i) NSKEWN is the negative one multiplied by the 
skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns in a given year; ii) DUVOL - “down-to-up” volatility – is the 
standard deviation of below the mean weekly firm-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of 
above the mean weekly firm-specific returns in a given year. SEO is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the firm conducted a public seasoned equity offering during the prior year and zero otherwise.  EM is 
an indicator variable that equals one for firms above median of accruals in their country in the prior year 
to an SEO and zero otherwise. Delist is an indicator variable that equals one starting in year t+2 after the 
cross-delisting event in year t, and zero otherwise. The set of control variables includes: TURN is the 
yearly change in the average monthly share turnover in the previous year (t-1); SIZE is the logarithm of 
the market value of equity in year t-1; STDEV is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in 
year t-1; RETURN is the logarithm of one plus the residual estimated from equation (1) in year t-1; ROA 
is the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets in year t-1; LEVERAGE is the total debt 
scaled by total assets in year t-1; ALPHA is the natural logarithm of one plus the intercept (alpha) 
estimated from equation (1) in year t-1; MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity in year t-1; DISACCR is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified 
Jones’ (1991) Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) in year t-1. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Models (1) and (3) are baseline estimations. In Models (2) and (4), we use a matched 
sample; each year we match firms from issuers group to firms from non-issuers group from the same 
year, industry, country and with the closest propensity score based on the probability of being an equity 
issuer. Robust t-statistics standard errors clustered at country-level are shown in parentheses. Country, 
industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is 
also reported (in parentheses). The last two rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the 
coefficients [
37,	
 +  37,	
 × ,	 × ,	
 + "37,	
 × , + #37,	
 ×,	]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  
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Dependent Variable: NSKEWN DUVOL 
  
Baseline Matched  Baseline Matched  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SEOt-1 0.1266 0.1505* 0.0287 0.0328 
 (1.57) (1.81) (1.10) (1.20) 
EMt-2 -0.0084 0.0242 0.0023 0.0093 
 
(-0.28) (0.57) (0.16) (0.40) 
Delistt -0.0271 0.0654 -0.0547** -0.0273 
 
(-0.43) (0.84) (-2.18) (-0.82) 
SEOt-1 x EMt-2 x Delistt 0.4118** 0.4714** 0.1136* 0.1298* 
 (1.99) (2.07) (1.66) (1.72) 
SEOt-1 x Delistt -0.2975* -0.3334** -0.0703 -0.0761 
 (-1.94) (-2.44) (-1.13) (-1.30) 
SEOt-1 x EMt-2  0.0258 0.0090 0.0085 0.0079 
 
(0.23) (0.08) (0.20) (0.18) 
EMt-2 x Delistt -0.0113 -0.1017 0.0023 -0.0311 
 (-0.13) (-1.04) (0.07) (-0.78) 
TURNt-1 -0.0555 -0.5418 -0.0066 -0.2121 
 
(-0.27) (-1.16) (-0.10) (-1.22) 
SIZEt-1 0.0734*** 0.0620*** 0.0247*** 0.0196** 
 
(5.33) (2.82) (4.98) (2.27) 
STDEVt-1 0.1940 0.1857 0.1666 -0.1829 
 
(0.18) (1.11) (0.54) (-0.38) 
RETURNt-1 0.0944 -0.3214 -1.2653 -3.1291 
 
(0.03) (-0.08) (-0.66) (-1.17) 
ROAt-1 0.1776** 0.1782** 0.0050 -0.0053 
 
(2.12) (2.31) (0.20) (-0.12) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.0444 0.0221 0.0466 0.0773* 
 
(0.34) (0.14) (1.33) (1.75) 
MBt-1 -0.0057 -0.0032 0.0001 0.0009 
 
(-1.24) (-0.45) (0.04) (0.24) 
DISACCRt-1 0.0212 0.3591 -0.0065 0.1905* 
 
(0.11) (1.52) (-0.09) (1.88) 
ALPHAt-1 5.1402** 4.5835 4.3159*** 5.3186*** 
 
(2.41) (1.28) (3.66) (2.84) 








   
(2.54) (1.77) 
Constant -1.8174*** -0.3288 0.5385*** 0.5330*** 
 
(-8.18) (-0.66) (5.83) (3.33) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,280 1,741 3,280 1,741 
R-squared 0.079 0.097 0.087 0.101 
PROPENSITY SCORE     
LR chi2 (p value)  0.9220  0.9220 
[37 + 37 ×  ×  + 37 ×  + 37 × ] 0.2687* 0.2975*** 0.0805 0.0944** 
p-value (0.073) (0.010) (0.183) (0.038) 
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